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JOE CAMEL EXPLAINS IT TO THE BOARD: CORPORATE LAW, WOMEN 
IN THE WORKFORCE, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN 
THERESA A. GABALDON* 
A USER’S GUIDE 
The premise of this article is that corporate law, as it is currently 
understood and allowed to operate, inevitably leads to the exploitation of 
children as consumers.  The article acknowledges, deconstructs, and 
reconstructs some of the common understandings about both parenting and 
corporate function.  In doing so, it employs feminist method, including the use 
of storytelling and the invocation of experience in individual, anecdotal and 
statistical terms.  It also makes use of shifting voices, such as that of the 
recurring Joe Camel, who will guide the reader and a fictional corporate board 
through an understanding of the relationship between corporations and 
underage consumers, providing an articulation of the considerations that have 
motivated other boards in real life.  Joe’s initial introduction to the board is 
succeeded by a prologue describing a fictional scene set during the period in 
which the stay-at-home mother perhaps was most idealized, but children’s 
consumption preferences nonetheless were being felt.  This is followed by a 
formal introduction. 
 
INTRODUCING JOE 
Having lost his job as spokesperson for Reynolds Tobacco,1 Joe Camel 
has traded in his bomber jacket for pin-stripes.  [Readers now should 
imagine a cartoon camel in a suit.]  Meet Joe Camel, corporate consultant.  
Joe speaks: 
Gentlemen and lady [with nod toward token woman],2 thank you for 
inviting me to address the board.  My subject is why, today, there are 
 
 * Professor of Law and Carville Dickinson Benson Research Professor of Law, George 
Washington University.  B.S. 1975, University of Arizona; J.D. 1978, Harvard University.  The author 
gratefully acknowledges the inspiration of William T. Palmer and the efforts and insights of Robert 
L. Palmer. 
 1. “Old Joe” was retired as part of the settlement in Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 
P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994). 
 2. See Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 
TUL. L. REV. 1363 (2002) (describing relative scarcity of women on the boards of publicly held 
corporations, but relating increased representation of women, minorities, and non-nationals on 
corporate boards to new managerial attitudes); cf. David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board 
Diversity and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 50-51 (2003) (describing increases in firm value correlating 
with increased board diversity); Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”: 
Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 739-40 (2003) (discussing 
general benefits of increasing diversity); Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Board Room, 6 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 85 (2002) (discussing matters related to limited but possibly increasing diversity). 
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opportunities to maximize shareholder value in ways unlike any in history. By 
way of introduction, a few words sum it up.  Busy moms, contributing to 
production of new products.  New ways to reach kids and new research 
showing how to keep em hooked.  I like to call it creating a need and filling 
it or the free market never fails!  [More from Joe later.] 
 
PROLOGUE 
Oakdale, 1960 
Autumn had embraced Oakdale early that year.  A sapphire sky framed 
crimson and ochre leaves, providing a classic backdrop for the pilgrimage back 
to school.  Students large and small drifted through the streets, fully outfitted 
with the tools of their unchosen trade: new footgear, new clothing, new pencils, 
and, for the younger set, new crayons and new lunch boxes.  In the latter regard, 
girls largely endorsed Barbie or Cinderella, but young gentlemen had more to 
sort out.  Darby Wallace’s choice of Daniel Boone trailed him on a plastic strap 
as he traipsed toward Burkett Elementary, considering what was to come. 
Burkett was the newer of the town’s two grade schools.  The other, Oakdale 
Elementary, was a red-brick toaster on what passed, by village standards, for a 
busy street.  Burkett, however, settled its several one-story arms across a verdant 
expanse with a good-sized copse of trees.  Darby eagerly anticipated a 
rendezvous under arboreal cover with his best friend, Michael Levy, just as soon 
as the bell pealed three.  Michael was a passionate aficionado of Davy Crockett, 
and most certainly would insist on his favorite game of “Alamo,” a revisionist 
version in which Davy, handily assisted by Daniel Boone, always won.3  Side-
by-side or back-to-back, the comrades would slash at the cunning “Messicans,” 
represented by the highest clumps of undergrowth, until subjugation was 
complete.  Darby wished, for a moment, that his mother had not prevented him 
(forcefully, after tactful persuasion had failed) from bringing along his birthday 
pocket-knife, which surely would have impressed both Michael and the 
Messicans. 
Enough was novel about the school day itself, however, to distract Darby 
from any regrets.  First, of course, was the New Teacher, although the fact of the 
matter was that Mrs. Smith had taught Darby’s two older brothers and thus was 
well-known to the entire Wallace household.  Then, there was the matter of the 
New Desk.  Yes, indeed, for the first time since he had commenced his academic 
career, Darby was the initial occupant of a fresh-from-the-factory desk.  The 
desk was of the new style: rather than placing his personal effects in a metal bin 
with a wooden lift-up top underladen with gum and thoroughly scarred with 
someone else’s initials, he put his books and other paraphernalia in an open box 
built-in sideways under his seat.  This new desk model afforded on a regular 
basis, the opportunity to hang upside down and observe the world from a new 
 
 3. See generally Rachel Borup, Bankers in Buckskins: Caroline Kirkland’s Critique of Frontier 
Masculinity: Critical Essay, 18 AM. TRANSCENDENTAL QUARTERLY 229 (2004) (discussing, among other 
things, the legends of Davy Crockett, Daniel Boone, and the Alamo); S. Derrickson Morre, As Kids, 
We All Had a Gun and a Rope and a Hatful of Hope, LAS CRUCES SUN-NEWS, Oct. 16, 2005, at 1A 
(discussing popularity in 1950s of Davy Crockett and Daniel Boone). 
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vantage point, and Darby availed himself of this opportunity frequently 
throughout the day. 
Darby thus was occupied as the New Boy entered the classroom.  The New 
Boy was ushered in mid-day and introduced to the class.  His name was Alan, 
and each and every one of the other boys noted with relief that the New Boy 
was small and that he looked like them.  From upside down, salt n’ pepper 
corduroy legs gave way to red-plaid flannel torso; a Lone Ranger lunch pail 
swung to the side, successfully completing and complementing the ensemble.  
Alan assumed his designated seat with an odd combination of diffidence and 
swagger.  Mrs. Smith, perhaps, was able to detect the tutelage of an elder in the 
way he carried himself; in any event, its effect upon the boys in the class was as 
desired.  They saw neither David nor Goliath, neither patsy nor foe. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Stating the Issue 
Speaking, for the moment, in sweeping and un-footnoted generalities, it 
has always been important to children to “fit in.”  As Darby’s story is meant to 
suggest, this has been true in America, notwithstanding some limited exaltation 
of “standing out” associated with idealization of rugged individualism and 
frontier spirit.  Popular reportage would lead one to believe that the pressure to 
fit in is even stronger in many other countries. 
Sweeping generalities point also to the ready conclusion that, at least in 
America, the nuclear family has played a critical role in introducing children to 
the ways of the larger community.  The family has served, in addition, as a 
counterweight to certain forms of juvenile peer pressure.  Few in number may 
be the members of the reading audience who actually have achieved their adult 
height without having heard from a parent, “If [fill in the name of your best 
friend in high school] jumped off a bridge, would you do it too?” 
The predictable next step in this line of thinking is a lament for the modern 
decline in the ability of the nuclear family to fulfill the roles just described.  The 
decline, of course, often is characterized as a consequence of the women’s 
liberation movement.4  The argument is as follows.  When mothers went to work 
in large numbers,5 they inescapably had less time to attend to concerns 
associated with hearth and home.6  When mothers began to see no need to 
legally cement their own relationships with the fathers of their children,7 the 
father-child bonds too became less stable.8  Alienated fathers and overworked 
mothers turned to the television for babysitting9 and . . . bingo, the children were 
 
 4. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
 6. See generally Lynn Doan, Girl Power, VISALIA TIMES-DELTA, May 21, 2005, at 5A (commenting 
on reduction in women’s time at home). 
 7. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 8. See generally Glenn Sachs, Are Boys Better Off Without Fathers?, THE SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER Sept. 6, 2005, at B7 (acknowledging the effect of absentee fathers); Kyuong M. Song, 
Marriage as Learned Behavior: Can Divorce be Foretold?, SEATTLE TIMES, Jul. 27, 2005, at F1 (commenting 
on disruption of familial bonds). 
 9. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
09_GABALDON.DOC 4/28/2006  8:57 AM 
206 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 13:203 2006 
body-snatched by programmers and advertisers.  The rest is history, a history 
accelerated by today’s video games and internet access. 
On a superficial level, the logic suffices.  No amount of hypothetical 
rebuttals—”But why should it be the woman’s job to take care of the children?,” 
or “Why should women be blamed for the decline in family stability?”—can 
make this superficial logic disappear.  Nor does “But studies show that high-
quality day care and/or some amount of television can be good for children” 
suffice.  Logic is logic, and neither day care nor television addresses the issue of 
whether the nuclear family is available to acculturate and guide. That some 
amount of day care or television can have value merely suggests that they are 
palatable substitutes for familial guidance that might be consciously selected by 
responsible parents. 
The next anticipated logical assault comes from the ilk of, “But working 
women have higher self-esteem and therefore can be better mothers.”  Strictly 
speaking, this argument only works if women with high self-esteem come home 
and effectively communicate their values to their children.  This logical inroad, 
however, is somewhat refuted by experience, which shows us that what women 
with high self-esteem actually do is come home from work and let their children 
watch television, play video games, and surf the internet (all activities, 
incidentally, that were not widely available to the young children when Darby 
Wallace roamed the schoolyard and Donna Reed held sway). 
Taking a step back, however, the decline in the effectiveness of nuclear 
families in communicating values is cause for lament only if the consequences 
themselves are lamentable.  In other words, if children still manage to acquire 
socially beneficial values, where’s the beef?  The fact of the matter is, no one 
really can tell whether the beef is even missing, since debate about which values 
are socially beneficial generally precludes any empirical conclusions as to how 
these values are or are not acquired.  Although there may be modest consensus 
that resort to violence—which we vaguely, if incorrectly, suspect of 
increasing10—is a social wrong, agreement about the social contribution of even 
such traditional values as monotheistic belief is not readily forthcoming. 
In other words, we cannot collectively know exactly what our values are, or 
precisely where, or even if, our children are now acquiring them.  We do know a 
great deal, however, about what else children are acquiring, and that is “stuff.”  
A ton of stuff.11  A ton of very expensive stuff.  A ton of very expensive stuff that 
has to be replaced very quickly as a result of changes in fancy and planned 
obsolescence. 
At the other end of the snake, more stuff is being produced, in part, 
because our economy is more productive than ever before, both owing to 
technology and to the entry of women into the work force.12  More marketing 
takes place because technology has coughed up more ways to do it and, 
perhaps, also because of shifting values.  More marketing to children takes place 
because it seems to work—a proposition that is essentially self-proven by the 
above-referenced phenomenon of children’s burgeoning acquisition of stuff, 
 
 10. See Chasing the Dream, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2005, at 53, 54. 
 11. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
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coupled with an exploding amount of resources devoted to marketing to 
children.13 
The choices—or non-choices—children make in the course of their 
purchasing frenzy are the focus of this article, which utilizes feminist method to 
examine the interaction of child-driven markets (defined as markets in which 
consumption is influenced, in whole or in part, by the desires of children) and 
corporate law.  It is the author’s position that corporate law, as currently 
understood and allowed to operate in an early twenty-first century context, 
inevitably leads to exploitation of children’s desires.  This point is made and 
reiterated in the voice of Joe Camel “explaining” to the board what they almost 
certainly already know, but probably paid him, as an independent consultant, to 
justify.  The case for the proposition is buttressed as follows.  Part II-A provides 
background on the effect of the women’s liberation movement on economic 
development (including increased productivity and technology), family life, and 
analytic methodology.  It introduces and employs feminist method in setting the 
stage for the conclusion that women’s presence in the workforce has 
contributed, in complex ways, to corporate opportunism vis-à-vis children as 
consumers.  Part II-B addresses corporate law, explaining its insistent 
privileging of shareholder interests and describing its abstract justifying 
assumptions about marketplace rationality.  This analysis sheds light on the 
propensity of corporate decision-makers to avoid contemplation of the effects 
they may have on the quality of children’s lives.  Part II-C describes the 
burgeoning phenomenon of consumption by children, as well as detailing some 
of its consequences.  Part III integrates the disparate discussions of Part II, 
explaining how feminist analysis of women’s experience and corporate form 
and function leads to the conclusion that corporate America is engaging in the 
effective rape and pillage of the pocketbooks and, more importantly, the psyches 
of American children.  Part IV proposes partial solutions. 
Notwithstanding any “but-for” correlations (or lack thereof), it is no doubt 
objectionable and offensive to place any part of the exploitation of American 
children at the door of working women.  Nonetheless, there is something 
sullying working women’s collective door mats, and that something is the 
experience of guilt, whether irrational or not.14  Catholic guilt, Jewish guilt, name 
your ethnicity guilt are mere nothings compared to working-mother guilt.  This 
article concludes by taking the only half-frivolous position that working women 
might confront and attempt to alleviate their feelings of guilt by implementing 
at least some of the suggestions advanced.15 
 
And now for a word from Joe: 
Im sure, gentlemen and lady, being who you are,16 that you already get 
my drift.  Like any good speaker, Ive told you what Im going to tell you.  
 
 13. See infra notes 84, 87 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. Studies indicate that persons rising to the level of the board of publicly held corporations 
are likely to express fairly uniform values, notwithstanding facial attempts at diversity.  See infra 
note 160 and accompanying text. 
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Now, Ill tell you what Im telling you, before I tell you what I told you.  
Heres the important part of what Im saying: Its your duty to make money 
for your shareholders.  You do this by filling consumers needs, which they 
express by paying for what you provide.  As long as they keep paying, it 
proves that the system is working.  Are we all on the same page here or 
what? 
II.  BACKGROUND: THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT,  
SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY, AND CHILD-DRIVEN MARKETS 
Thus far, this article has suggested that the women’s movement has 
interacted with the widely acknowledged corporate valuing of shareholder 
primacy in such a way as to permit—and even to demand —the exploitation of 
child-driven markets.  Before persuading the reader that the linkage is as 
suggested and  that it is problematic, particularly for women, a bit more 
explanation is required. 
A. The Women’s Movement: Changing Demographics and Changing Analysis 
Even those who vehemently deny evolution probably will admit that the 
position of women in society has undergone dramatic change within the last few 
decades.  The only dispute is whether the change has been a desirable one.  This 
article seeks to avoid that question.  It does, however, briefly illustrate the 
change by reference to the author’s family history, as well as document it by 
reference to demographic trends.  It then describes some of the analytical tools 
introduced by feminism, which served as the catalyst for this dramatic social 
change.  Part III uses those tools to demonstrate that the change itself 
retrospectively may be characterized as one of the elements in this “perfect 
storm” resulting in the wholesale exploitation of American children. 
1. Changing Demographics 
a. One Family’s Story 
 
Inez Chavez Gabaldon 
1879–1963 
My grandmother, Grandma Inez, had fifteen children and never worked 
“outside the home”—or, at any rate, never received wages for her labor on the 
family’s subsistence farm.  Upon the death of her husband at age forty-eight, she 
became an entrepreneur of sorts, sending her two youngest sons door-to-door to 
sell her cheese.  She did not speak English, had no formal schooling, and did not 
own a television until she was eighty-years-old. 
 
Jacqueline Sykes Gabaldon 
1930–1971 
My mother married in college, but earned both her B.A. and M.A. while 
caring for my sister and me.  The family television received four channels, and 
we were regular viewers of Romper Room, which was broadcast only three days a 
week but nonetheless was a boon of time while Mom did her homework and 
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housework.  She taught us to read, and our devotion to that activity provided 
her with even more time.  My grandmother cared for us while my mother was 
in class; Mom took us with her to do her student teaching.  The year I, her 
youngest, started kindergarten, she entered the traditional work force as a 
teacher.  She thereafter happily relinquished the lion’s share of her salary to pay 
a five-day-a-week housekeeper to do the cleaning and laundry and to watch us 
during the one-hour gap between our arrival at home and hers. 
 
The Author 
1954– 
I went to college, on to law school, and into law practice.  If I had stayed in 
practice, I might have had children, but I don’t know how.  (Well, yes, I know 
how, it’s really the when that I’m quibbling about.)  In any event, I became a 
partner, went into teaching, got married, got tenure, had a child during a 
sabbatical, and put him into day care when he was six months old.  He is now 
twelve years old, and because of all I had read before he was born, he has never 
watched more than an hour of television a week (do not tell his friends).  
Movies, however, are something else, and he uses the internet (sometimes at the 
behest of his school), and then there are the video games . . . but I am getting 
ahead of the story. 
 
The Point 
We all are familiar with idealized accounts of earlier social conditions in 
which the spheres of home and work were separated and the former was 
allocated to dedicated domestic goddesses.17  These accounts come closest to 
reflecting a possible reality during the brief period between the Industrial 
Revolution and the Technology Revolution.18  Even when these accounts are 
confined to this temporally plausible context, however, they  necessarily fail to 
reflect the stories of many women’s real lives.  Readers rummaging through 
their own closets of recollection may, before moving on, be interested in testing 
their own recent family histories against popular mythology. 
b. A Numbers Story 
Relevant facts about the changing lives of American women could fill 
volumes, and individually are quite interesting.  More important for purposes of 
this article, they provide an impressionistic rendering that well may be the 
 
 17. See generally Stephanie Coontz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE 
NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992); Nancy F. Cott, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD 70 (2d ed. 1997); Theresa A. 
Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and other Reflections on the Limited Liability of Corporate 
Shareholders, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1428-29 (1992) [hereinafter Gabaldon, Lemonade Stand]; Dorothy 
E. Smith, Women, the Family and Corporate Capitalism, in WOMEN IN CANADA 17 (Marylee Stephenson 
ed., 1977). 
 18. See Marlene O’Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: Investing in Our 
Future Human Capital in Turbulent Times, 77 S.C. L. REV. 1258, 1277-89 (2004) [hereinafter O’Connor-
Felman, Human Capital]; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Reframing the Debate about the 
Socialization of Children: An Environmentalist Paradigm, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 113-14 (2004) 
(describing effect of industrialization on “sacralization” of childhood and characterizing childhood 
as a cultural construct). 
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source of our perception of the decline and fall of the American family.  The 
following facts are provided to document critical differences in the lives of 
American women between the middle and the end of the twentieth century.  
This documentation provides a basis for concluding, among other things, that 
parental time and energy for the supervision of children has declined. 
Fact: In the middle of the twentieth century, approximately one-third of 
American women worked outside the home (loosely meaning “got paid in 
money for what they did”).19  By 2004, over two-thirds did so.20 
Fact: For women with small children, the shift was an even more dramatic rise 
from less than twenty percent to approximately sixty percent.21 
Fact: An increase in the work force attributable to the entry of women is 
correlated chronologically with an increase in productivity in the American 
economy.22 
Fact: On average, Americans work more hours today than they did before the 
Industrial Revolution.23 
Fact: Over half of American households now believe they cannot afford the 
things they really need.24 
Fact: Half of American marriages end in divorce; sixty percent of American 
divorces involve children.25 
Fact: One out of three American children is born out of wedlock (up from one 
out of thirteen in the 1960s).26 
Fact: Almost a quarter of American households are headed by single women.27 
 
 19. Ronald Rindfuss et al., Women, Work and Children: Behavior and Attitudinal Change in the 
United States, 22 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 457, 461 (1996). 
 20. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Characteristics of Families (2005), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.toc.htm. 
 21. Id.; see also Teresa Arendell, Mothering and Motherhood: A Decade Review 13 (Ctr. for Working 
Families, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 3, 1990). 
 22. Mona L. Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 VA. TAX REV. 347, 
380-90 (2000); see also MARTIN CARNOY, SUSTAINING THE NEW ECONOMY: WORK, FAMILY AND 
COMMUNITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 111 (2000) (asserting that women’s movement preceded rise 
of the “new economy”). 
 23. Hymel, supra note 22, at 392. 
 24. Id. at 387. 
 25. Arendell, Mothering and Motherhood, supra note 21, at 10. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 12.  It is estimated that sixty percent of American children will spend time in a single-
parent household.  Anita Garey & Terry Arendell, Children, Work, and Family: Some Thoughts on 
Mother Blame 15 (Ctr. for Working Families, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 4, 1999). 
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Fact: Mothers work fewer hours outside the home than do other workers;28 
however, they earn substantially less, bringing home approximately sixty 
percent of what other workers receive.29 
Fact: Notwithstanding employment outside the home, women spend 
significantly more time on childcare and housework than do men.30 
Fact: Working mothers are sleep-deprived and time-crunched.31 
Fact: Working mothers feel guilty about not spending more time at work and 
feel guilty about not spending more time with their children.32 
c. New Tools 
Sometime during the earliest days of the late twentieth century evolution in 
women’s lives, something changed about the way a significant number of them 
thought about those lives.33  It is arguable, in fact, that this change in 
perspective—generally referred to as “feminism”—was a condition precedent 
for the momentum of the demographic shift described above.34  To the extent 
that the popularization of feminist thinking and deliberate demographic shifts 
indeed can be linked, they are collectively referred to in this article as the 
“women’s liberation movement.”35 
All of the many manifestations of feminism share a root concern with 
identifying the various causes of women’s subordinate position in a patriarchal 
society, as well as a common goal of ending that subordination.36  Inequality 
 
 28. Jane Waldfogel, The Effects of Children on Women’s Wages, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 209 (1997). 
 29. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who 
Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 78 (2003). 
 30. Linda R. Hirshman, Homeward BOUND, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 2005, at 20; ARLIE HOCHSCHILD 
& ANNE MACHENY, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 271-79 
(1989); see generally RHONDA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND 
BARGAINING POWER (1995) (describing domestic allocations of labor); cf. Arlie Hochschild, Who Cares 
for the Elderly?, LA TIMES, Dec. 10, 2005, at B21 (describing similar phenomenon in context of 
eldercare). 
 31. Phyllis Moen & Stephen Sweet, The New Workforce, the New Economy and the Lock-Step Life 
Course: An American Dilemma 3 (Cornell Univ., Coll. of Human Ecology, Working Paper No. 02-21, 
2002); Juliet Schor, Time Crunch Among American Parents, in TAKING PARENTING PUBLIC: THE CASE 
FOR A NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT 83 (Sylvia Ann Hewlett et al. eds., 2002). 
 32. As testimony to the ubiquity of this phenomenon, a Lexis-Nexis search in the “News, All” 
database, using the search term “working mother” appearing within three words of “guilt” 
produced 646 results.  See also O’Connor-Felman, Human Capital, supra note 18, at 1309-10 (discussing 
guilt and exhaustion). 
 33. See O’Connor-Felman, Human Capital, supra note 18, at 1287 (crediting BETTY FRIEDAN, THE 
FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963) with initiation of the movement). 
 34. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
 35. This is a term also encompassing, in popular usage, various forms of political and other 
activism directed toward improving the position of women in society. 
 36. Linda J. Lacey, Introducing Feminist Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Oklahoma=s Seduction 
Statute, 25 TULSA L.J. 775, 780 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
617, 617-18 (1990); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Jurisprudence: An Agenda for Research, 56 U. 
CIN. L. REV., 521, 523 (1987). 
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lurks, of course, behind overtly discriminatory laws,37 but also is imposed, more 
subtly, through legal and social regimes based on principles that are not 
endorsed by those excluded from power.38  Feminists seek to reveal both (1) that 
these principles are inherent in a variety of fields, including various fields of 
law, and (2) what the consequences of these principles are.39  As a core part of 
this endeavor, feminists examine women’s actual experiences, explore women’s 
values, and assess the existing legal and social structures in terms of their 
congruence with those experiences and values.  This type of analysis does not 
demand the assumption that the experiences and values of women diverge 
significantly from those of men, but it is driven by the possibility that such a 
divergence may exist.40 
As an integral part of their analytical process, feminist scholars make use of 
the concept of “gender,” which is defined as the socially constructed, as opposed 
to biological, differences between being male and female.41  The term 
“gendered” sometimes is used to describe structures, analyses, etc., that are the 
outcome of gender.  It may, for example, be said that corporate law is gendered 
because it predominantly is the product of men, constructed in, perhaps 
unknowing, reliance on their own experience of being male in society.42  As the 
following section reveals, the landscape of corporate law indeed is characterized 
by such socially-ascribed male characteristics as competitiveness, paternalism, 
and formal rationality. 
 
 37. See generally Alan Blanco, Comment, Fetal Protection Programs under Title VII—Rebutting the 
Procreation Presumption, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 755 (1985). 
 38. See Gabaldon, Lemonade Stand, supra note 17, at 1389. 
 39. Id. at 1418. 
 40. One difficulty faced by any feminist analysis is attempting to articulate the values manifest 
in the experience of women; this is known as “essentializing.”  Theresa A. Gabaldon, Feminism, 
Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate and Securities Law, 5 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (1995) 
[hereinafter Gabaldon, Feminism, Fairness, and Fiduciary Duty] (arguing that one feminist task is to 
articulate the values manifest in the experience of women, and to assess various existing legal and 
social structures for fit with these values).  To focus on the values of women presupposes that those 
values will be common, and it tempts the analyst to assume that her own experience is an 
appropriate surrogate for the experience of all.  Id.  Critical race theorists usefully have identified 
this issue and illustrated its existence.  See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist 
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 603 (1990) (contending the theory that some women’s experience 
as mothers should be asserted for all women is questionable); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism and Feminist 
Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 115 (1989).  Accepting the lesson of essentialism does, however, 
complement and refine the assertion that subjugation can come in different shapes and sizes.  Thus, 
if the values of even some women identifiably diverge from those underlying a legal regime, it is a 
matter with which to be reckoned. 
 41. See, e.g., Mary Ann Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate 
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1 (1995) (giving a general discussion of 
“gendering”).  For example, between the Industrial Revolution and the advent of the women’s 
liberation movement, the popularly ascribed gender role of women was to remain at home, raising 
children (although, most certainly, some women, either as a matter of aspiration or necessity, did 
deviate).  That gender role has now been questioned and has shifted for some segments of society. 
 42. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Corporate Conscience and the White Man’s Burden, 71 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 944, 945 (2002) (discussing outsider suspicion of the “white man” in shaping corporations, 
corporate law, and corporate law commentary). 
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B. Corporate Law and Shareholder Primacy 
1. Corporate Stories 
The stories of corporations and corporate law are as many and varied as the 
life stories of women.  No matter the point one wishes to make, a story can be 
invoked.  The stories that follow were specifically chosen, of course, to illustrate 
that corporate profit-seeking behavior deliberately seeks influence in child-
driven markets. 
 
Joe Camel 
Once upon a time, a corporation in search of profit manufactured 
cigarettes.  Men in charge learned that the corporation’s products were 
addictive, which was good for the corporation and could be—and was—made 
even better by tinkering with the mix.43  Unfortunately for the corporation, even 
addicted consumers had alternate sources of cigarettes,44 so the company sought 
to build brand loyalty using a cartoon camel that was, for a time, as familiar to 
children as Mickey Mouse.45  The men in charge cannot have overlooked the fact 
that the camel—let’s call him Joe—drew the attention of those who one day 
became addicted juvenile smokers, “branded,” by reason of their attraction to 
Joe, for what these men in charge hoped would be their entire lives.46 
 
Michael Jordan 
Once upon a time, a corporation in search of profit manufactured sneakers.  
Men in charge observed that children were insecure and impressionable and 
sought to be like their heroes.  Paying a sports hero—like Michael Jordan—to 
wear the corporation’s sneakers brought handsome returns, as underage 
consumers paid astounding premiums for footgear that cost relatively little to 
make.47  Very few of these consumers became basketball stars, but some of them 
were killed for their sneakers, and many more had them stolen.48 
 
 
 43. See generally State v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 134813 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 
Mar. 26, 1998). 
 44. See J. Howard Beales, III, Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory Retrospective that 
Advises the Present, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 873, 891-892 (2004) (describing competition). 
 45. Paul Fischer et al., Brand Logo Recognition by Children Aged 3 to 6 Years: Mickey Mouse and Old 
Joe the Camel, 3 JAMA 3145, 3147 (1991). 
 46. See, e.g., Hymel, supra note 22, at 418; Michael A. McCann, Economic Efficiently and Consumer 
Choice in Nutritional Labeling, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1161, 1182 (2004) (discussing the “branding” 
phenomenon generally). 
 47. For a discussion of the allegations that Nike employed third-world child-labor under 
sweatshop conditions, as well as Nike’s later efforts to rehabilitate its image, see Meg Carter, Ethical 
Business Practices Come into Fashion, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Apr. 19, 2005, at 14. 
 48. Cf., e.g., Avram Goldstein, Police Seek Witnesses, Suspect in Slaying, WASH. POST, Jan 25, 1998, 
at B03 (describing a killing for a jacket); Hymel, supra note 22, at 390 (commenting on effect of 
jealousy over clothing); Troy Y. Nelson, If Clothes Make the Person, Do Uniforms Make the Student?  
Constitutional Free Speech Rights and Student Uniforms in Public Schools, 118 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3-4 (1997) 
(same, and including allusions to predictable violence). 
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Doom49 
Once upon a time, a corporation in search of profit manufactured video 
games.  Men in charge learned that children become addicted to violence in their 
entertainment, even as they become desensitized to it.50  Increasing the violence 
of the games seemed the logical solution.  Corporate logic also dictated, of 
course, that the new, more violent games—like Doom, which is based on a video 
exercise used by the Marines to desensitize recruits to the taking of human life—
still be marketed to children.  Seventy percent of video games rated “M” for 
“mature audiences” are currently marketed to children under the age of 
seventeen.51 
 
The Point 
The not-so-subtle point is that corporations make no attempt to integrate 
parental judgments in their own decision making.52  They are in business to 
make money, not to watch out for the best interests of children, psychic or 
otherwise.  The argument that corporations do not act in loco parentis is further 
substantiated by the proliferation of sugary cereals and other junk food, as well 
as by the deluge of advertising marketing them to children.53 
2. Official Stories 
A great deal—in fact, way too much—has been written and said on the 
subject of corporate purpose.54  The debate about corporate purpose largely 
revolves around whose interests corporate directors primarily should serve.55  
Decades of interest in the subject have produced two fairly mainstream 
approaches, set out below in order both of chronology and general acceptance. 
a. The Contractarians: The Givens and the Goals of Shareholder 
Primacy 
One school of thought describes the corporation as a “nexus of contracts” 
among capital providers, managers, employees, and others, all of whom conduct 
 
 49. Doom is a “point and shoot” video game, more fully described in Scott Whittier, School 
Shootings: Are Video Game Manufacturers Doomed to Tort Liability?, 17 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 11 (2000). 
 50. See Tara C. Campbell, Comment, Did Video Games Train the School Shooters to Kill?: 
Determining Whether Wisconsin Courts Should Impose Negligence or Strict Liability in a Lawsuit Against 
the Video Game Manufacturers, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 811, 819-22 (2001) [hereinafter Campbell, School 
Shooters]. 
 51. Id. at 818 (citing CNN Talkback Live: Is Hollywood Marketing Sex and Violence to our Kids? (CNN 
television broadcast, Sept. 14, 2000)); Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 117. 
 52. Cf. Angela J. Campbell, Ads2Kids.com: Should Government Regulate Advertising to Children on 
the World Wide Web?, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 311, 341-43 (1997-1998) [hereinafter Campbell, Ads2Kids] 
(developing argument for skepticism about corporation’s self-imposed efforts in this regard); 
Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 115 (describing failure of voluntary controls by corporate providers of 
video games, films and CDs). 
 53. See generally Beales, supra note 44, at 834-78 (describing advertising of fast food); McCann, 
supra note 46, at 1181-82 (same). 
 54. Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding the Purpose of a Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. 
L. 807-09 (1999) (reflecting on corporate purpose). 
 55. Id. at 809-11. 
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themselves in a manner that is rationally self-interested.56  Adherents to this 
school, sometimes known as “contractarians,” characterize the “best,” or “most 
efficient,” corporate law as providing the “best,” or “most efficient” set of 
default contract rules.57  These are the rules that contractarians have determined 
the parties would negotiate for themselves most frequently, but which still may 
be negotiated around at the parties’ behest.58 
The rules generally endorsed by contractarians reflect the assumption that 
managers are agents for shareholders.59  Limiting the duties of the board of 
directors to serving shareholder interests is considered the single best method of 
limiting managerial opportunism and shirking, owing to the relative efficiency 
of monitoring by a single class of beneficiaries.60  The board therefore is regarded 
as responsible for maximizing the residual value of the firm remaining after 
non-shareholder claimants are satisfied.61  This easily translates to the twin 
assertions that the goal of the corporation is to make money for its shareholders62 
and that the interests of shareholders are to be preferred over those of others 
with interests in the firm.63  The resulting template for corporate law thus is 
known as the “shareholder primacy” model.64 
b. The Progressives and Fellow Travelers 
During the 1990s, a group of corporate law scholars launched an attack on 
the neoclassical economic analysis just described.65  The attack focused on the 
relationship between management and shareholders and quickly rejected the 
notion of shareholder primacy.66  Corporate “progressives” generally endorse an 
expansion of the goals of the corporation and the duties of management to 
 
 56. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306-07 (1976) (discussing the corporation as a 
nexus of principal-agent contracts); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 17 (1991) [hereinafter EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE] (discussing the corporate contract); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 770 (1989) (characterizing the corporation 
as a nexus of contracts). 
 57. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 56, at 7-8. 
 58. Id. at 17. 
 59. See id. at 4, 91. 
 60. Id. at 35-39. 
 61. See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not So Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1189, 1193 (2002) (discussing stockholders as residual claimants of the corporation). 
 62. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 56, at 35-39. 
 63. Id. at 90-94. 
 64. David Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual?  A Critique of the Team Production Model of 
Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1005-09 (2000) (discussing shareholder primacy and managerial 
shirking). 
 65. David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 16-22 (Lawrence Mitchell ed., 1995) [hereinafter Millon, 
Communitarianism]. 
 66. See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 56, at 306 (arguing in support of 
shareholder primacy); Millon, Communitarianism, supra note 65, at 9-11; Lyman Johnson, New 
Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1713, 1714 (1993) (contending the number of 
people that view shareholder primacy as the default norm is decreasing). 
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include responsibility to other constituents,67 frequently arguing for the 
recognition of enforceable fiduciary duties running from directors to groups 
such as creditors and employees.68  Progressives also have proposed methods of 
increasing the board’s discretion to recognize non-shareholder interests69  by 
extending the terms for which members of the board are elected and adopting 
statutory safe harbors for situations where board members may consider the 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies.70 
Two au courant schools of corporate analysis sometimes are identified with 
the progressive movement.  The first is the “team production” approach.71  The 
second is “behavioral economics.”72  Both speak the language of neoclassical 
economics and, although they divergently realign some of its basic assumptions, 
they derive similar, “progressive” conclusions. 
“Team production” scholars contend that the board of directors should be 
understood as an independent “mediating hierarch” among the various 
constituents of a corporation; in their view, the constituents are those with 
“team specific” inputs.73  The board is charged both with employing the inputs 
of financiers, workers, communities, etc., to maximize the value of the firm and 
with allocating resulting profits fairly among the inputting groups.74  In this 
model, the interests of shareholders are not to be preferred, except in somewhat 
unremarkable procedural ways, such as the ability to elect directors and to bring 
derivative actions on behalf of the corporation.75  The long-standing acceptance 
of corporate philanthropy is invoked as evidence of the model’s descriptive 
power.76 
The second recently popularized approach to corporate law is “behavioral 
economics,” which uses empirical studies of human behavior to reassess and 
 
 67. See, e.g., Millon, Communitarianism, supra note 65, at 1; Wai Shun Wilson Leung, The 
Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate Regime That Recognizes Non-Shareholder 
Interests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 587 (1997). 
 68. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 
1178 (1990) (arguing that fiduciary rights should be extended to corporate bondholders); Marleen A. 
O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect 
Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1235 (1991) (arguing that fiduciary duties should extend to 
displaced workers) [hereinafter O’Connor, Displaced Workers]. 
 69. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency 
Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 581-82 (1992). 
 70. LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 97-118 
(2001) [hereinafter MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY]. 
 71. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 
247 (1999).  Note, however, that the adherents of this model specifically disavow identification as 
“progressives.”  Id. at 253-54. 
 72. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of 
Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002); Christine Jolls, et al., A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). 
 73. Blair & Stout, supra note 71, at 250. 
 74. Id. at 250-51. 
 75. Id. at 313-15. 
 76. See Margaret M. Blair, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Philanthropy, 28 STETSON L. REV. 27 
(1998) (defending director’s contributions to corporate charities through the team production 
model). 
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revamp some of the assumptions of neoclassical economic analysis.77  For 
purposes of this article, some of the most important insights of this method 
involve the role of altruism in economic behavior.  Numerous studies document 
that human beings do act in a manner that is moderately altruistic rather than 
classically self-interested.78  This means that the outcomes hypothetically 
bargained for by those involved in the behavioral economist’s corporate nexus 
of contracts could be quite different from those hypothetically achieved as a 
matter of neoclassical economic analysis.  Notably, shareholders might prefer 
that directors should have discretion to compromise the strict financial interests 
of the shareholders.79  One might hope that this would be the case in situations 
where shareholders are aware that corporations are exploiting children’s 
vulnerability as consumers. 
C. Who’s Watching the Children?: An Analysis of the Consequences and Cause 
of Child-Driven Markets 
The consequences to children of corporate decision-making can be 
illustrated in a variety of ways, from anecdotes that reveal the impact on 
individual children, to statistical evidence that demonstrates the effects on 
children as a group.  Although the following somewhat subverts the usual 
ordering by placing consequence before logical proof of cause, it does so for a 
reason: the effects of corporate stimulation of, and pandering to, the tastes of 
underage consumers are life-shaping and sometimes life-threatening.  Only if 
the reader sees the devastating effects of the problem will he or she be truly 
open to an investigation of what its causes are. 
1. Children’s Stories 
 
The West Paducah Shooter 
On a dismal day in the recent past, a fourteen-year-old boy entered his high 
school and opened fire.80  Although the boy had never before shot a handgun, 
his marksmanship was uncanny: eight shots fired in three seconds hit eight 
people in either the head or the torso.  Experts later expressed the opinion that 
the only way to account for his proficiency was his hours of  experience playing 
violent video games.81 
 
 77. Greenfield, supra note 72, at 588 (“[Behavioral law and economics] insights may prove to 
weaken conventional corporate law theory sufficiently so that much of it will have to be 
reconsidered and replaced.”); see e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of 
Corporate Compliance with the Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71 (2002); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming 
the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
135 (2002). 
 78. Greenfield, supra note 72, at 628. 
 79. Cf. id. at 633-40 (discussing significance of behavioral incentives to share and cooperate for 
the conduct of directors, without addressing shareholder preference). 
 80. See Campbell, School Shooters, supra note 50, at 813-15. 
 81. See generally Bobby Ross, Jr., Violence: Who’s to Blame? Society Looks at the Media, 
Entertainment Sources, SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 26, 1999; cf. Bonnie B. Phillips, Virtual Violence or 
Virtual Apprenticeship: Justification for the Recognition of a Violent Video Game Exception to the Scope of 
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The Big Mac Attack 
Ashley Pelman was fourteen years old, 4’10” tall, and weighed 170 pounds.  
Jazlyn Bradly was nineteen, 5’6”, and 270 pounds.82  These two morbidly obese 
teenagers brought suit against McDonald’s Corporation, making various claims 
about the promotion and manufacture of McDonald’s products.  Among other 
things, they alleged that they had been misled about the nutritional value of the 
McDonald’s products they had consumed.  Their law suit, described as 
“quixotic,” was dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted.83  Their lack of a legal claim, however, did not make the teenagers any 
healthier, happier, or lighter. 
 
The Bling-Bling King 
My son lives in one of the wealthiest counties in America.  He watches 
almost no television.  His base school has very few minorities. Two things are 
matters of gospel to him.  He is convinced that he must speak fluent “ghetto” to 
be popular with his peers, and he is POSITIVE that he must own every video 
gaming device and game owned by any of his circle of friends.  He nags, 
wheedles, cajoles, does “mega-beg” (involving actual prostration), makes 
promises about grades and chores, and, more often than I like to admit, gets his 
way.  He owns several games rated “T” for “teen”; moreover, he admits to 
sometimes watching his friends play games rated “M.”  This is the young video-
gamers’ equivalent of smoking without inhaling. 
 
The Point 
The point of these anecdotes, once again, is not very subtle.  Commerce has 
invaded and shaped the lives of children.  Examples abound, both close to home 
and further afield. 
2. Another Numbers Story 
Whoever it is who may be charged with the day-to-day monitoring of 
individual children’s physical needs, it is clear that children as a group are being 
very closely watched by corporate America - and for very good reasons.  First, 
children comprise a gigantic market.  Second, they are highly susceptible to 
suggestion and manipulation.  Both of these assertions are documented below; 
other interesting facts are thrown in for good measure. 
Fact: Children between the ages of four and twelve engage in over $24 billion of 
direct consumer purchasing each year.84  Their preferences are said to affect an 
 
First Amendment Rights of Minors, 36 IND. L. REV. 1385 (2003) (generally discussing relationship of 
video gaming and violence). 
 82. Benjamin Weiser, Big Macs Can Make You Fat? No Kidding, a Judge Rules, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 
2003, at B3. 
 83. Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 517-18, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  For a more 
thorough discussion, see McCann, supra note 46, at 1163 (using the “quixotic” characterization). 
 84. See James U. McNeal, Tapping the Three Kids’ Markets, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS, Apr. 1998, 
at 36. 
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additional $300 billion of annual consumer transactions.85  When the influence of 
older children also is taken into account, the purchasing power of the childish 
market truly is monstrous.86 
Fact: Children are more trusting than adults, and they tend to view 
advertisements as advice from a friend.87  Children under five generally cannot 
distinguish between commercials and programming (including news 
programming);88 children under eight generally cannot understand that 
commercials are designed to persuade them to make purchases.89 
Fact: The average child views more than forty thousand commercials a year.90 
Fact: Children are more prone to take risks and value short-term over long-term 
consequences than any other age group.91 
Fact: Fifty percent of children have televisions in their bedrooms.92 
Fact: Children spend, on average, twenty-eight hours a week watching 
television;93 “mass-mediated story tellers reach them on the average of more 
than seven hours a day . . . .”94 
Fact: Television viewing, video gaming, and computer gaming are correlated 
with weight gain.95 
Fact: Experts believe that television viewing is a prime explanation for 
increasing attention deficit disorders96 and has a negative correlation with school 
performance.97 
Fact: Advertisers attempt to establish brand loyalty in young children.98 
 
 85. See Hymel, supra note 22, at 405. 
 86. One 1992 study estimated 1992 spending by teenagers at $93 billion.  Id. 
 87. Campbell, Ads2Kids, supra note 52, at 320 (citing Petition of Action for Children’s Television 
for Rulemaking, Children’s Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 FCC 2d 1, 11, 16 (1974) aff ‘d, 
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (1974 Policy Statement)). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 102. 
 91. See Barbara A. Atwood, The Child’s Voice in Custody Litigation: An Empirical Survey and 
Suggestions for Reform, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 657 (2003). 
 92. Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 106. 
 93. AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN GUIDE TO MEDIA VIOLENCE 8 (1996), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/386/mediaviolence.pdf. 
 94. ROY F. FOX, HARVESTING MINDS: HOW TV COMMERCIALS CONTROL KIDS, at xii (1996). 
 95. Cara B. Ebbeling et al., Childhood Obesity: Public-Health Crisis, Common Sense Cure, 360 
LANCET 473, 475 (2002), available at http://www.commercialalert.org/childhoodobesity.pdf; Steven 
L. Gortmaker et al., Television Viewing as a Cause of Increasing Obesity Among Children in the United 
States, 1986-1990, 150 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 356 (1996). 
 96. Dimitri A Christakis et al., Early Television Exposure and Subsequent Attentional Problems in 
Children, 113 PEDIATRICS 708, 710 (2004). 
 97. Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 107. 
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Fact: Fast food companies dedicate most of their promotional budgets to 
targeting children.99 
Fact: Advertisers spend more than $24 billion a year on youth marketing.100 
Fact: Experts believe that playing video games involves “stimulus addiction,” 
leading players to crave increasing levels of stimulation, which can be satisfied 
through increasing violence.101 
Fact: Experts believe that violent video games increase short and long-term 
aggressive tendencies.102 
3. Rhetoric and Definitions 
The billions spent by children spring directly from the seeds of the billions 
invested in advertising to the youth market.  Some of the statistics recited above 
have been referred to by others as children’s “purchasing power.”  It is the 
contention of this article that children’s “purchasing power” is an oxymoron.  
Doing as one is told, whether by Mommy, Daddy, Joe Cool, or Michael Jordan, 
is not exercising a form of power.  Doing the telling, if one is not consciously 
attempting to act in the best interest of the child, is a form of exploitation.103 
This article uses the term “children’s manipulable preferences” to describe 
those desires of children that are subject to commercial exploitation—that is 
subject to stimulation by profit-seeking manipulation, whether by 
advertisement, endorsement, deliberate addiction, or whatever.  Thus, 
advertising sugary breakfast cereal on television shows watched by children is 
an attempt to exploit children’s manipulable preferences.  Paying a sports figure 
to wear clothing of a type marketed to children is an attempt to exploit 
children’s manipulable preferences.  Deliberately increasing the violence of 
video games marketed to children to stimulate the appetites jaded by the last 
escalation is an attempt to exploit children’s manipulable preferences.  Imprecise 
and impressionistic as the basic concept may be for purposes of discussion, it 
may be honed for purposes of action.  Further discussion will occur in Part III; 
honing for purposes of action will be one of the tasks of Part IV. 
 
 
 98. See, e.g., MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION 
AND HEALTH 25 (2002); Jane E. Brody, Schools Teach 3 C’s: Candy, Cookies, and Chips, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
24, 2002, at F7. 
 99. Marlene Arnold Nicholson, McLibel: A Case Study in British Defamation Law, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 
1, 139 (2000). 
 100. Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 102. 
 101. See Campbell, School Shooters, supra note 50, at 819-22. 
 102. See Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill, Video Games and Aggressive Thoughts, Feelings, and 
Behavior in Laboratory and in Life, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 772, 778 (2000): Kaveri 
Subrahmanyan et al., New Forms of Electronic Media: The Impact of Interactive Games and the Internet on 
Cognition, Socialization, and Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF CHILDREN AND THE MEDIA 73 (Dorothy G. 
Singer & Jerome L. Singer eds., 2001); but see Chasing the Dream, supra note 10 (contending that there 
is no long-term effect). 
 103. Cf. Hymel, supra note 22, at 409 (describing research on methods of manipulation). 
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Joe here: 
To reiterate, gentlemen and lady: Your job, which is to make money for 
shareholders, dovetails perfectly with the vital American need to give 
children something to spend their money on, as well as a tangible way for 
American parents to express their love.  After all, how else are they going 
to have time to do it? 
III.  A + B = C 
Section II provided background on the three phenomena discussed in the 
Introduction: first, that there has been a change in the position of women in 
society since the middle of the last century; second, that the widely accepted 
goal of the corporation is to make money for its shareholders; and third, that 
children buy or influence the buying of a tremendous amount of stuff, some of 
which is not particularly good for them.  Without a doubt, these phenomena are 
temporally linked.  It remains to this Section to establish that some other 
relationship may exist, that the relationship is a problematic one, and that it is 
particularly problematic for women. 
A. Corporate Law: Problem?  What Problem? 
1. Contractarians 
Contractarians generally have tended to deal in abstractions,104 and, 
presumably, if asked (or, more likely, forced), would address the three 
phenomena discussed above in the following manner: if women’s personal 
utility is maximized by entering the paying work force, they will do so.  If the 
availability of more workers creates an excess supply, wages will decline until 
equilibrium is reached.  If rational workers do not exit the workforce, it means 
there is no excess supply.  Thus, the workers are being utilized.  Because more 
workers now are being utilized than ever before, it means that the economy is 
waving its big invisible hand to produce more goods and services, which are 
being consumed by persons rationally valuing them in amounts sufficient to 
justify worker utilization.  A linkage between women in the workplace, an 
increase in production, and an increase in consumer demand thus is logical.  The 
source of the demand cannot be problematic, owing to the assumptions of the 
method.  The role of corporate management simply is to identify demands and 
utilize workers to fulfill those demands in such a way as to maximize the return 
to those who contribute non-human capital to the process. 
Contractarians do acknowledge the existence of certain externalities, like 
pollution, and other market imperfections that they believe should be addressed 
by laws external to the corporation.105  Presumably, if they became convinced 
that irrational consumption choices were being made, it would be a matter for 
external law to resolve.  From a realistic standpoint (and as further discussed in 
Part IV) this is unlikely to occur.  Passing laws on ratings and censoring and 
 
 104. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text; Gabaldon, Lemonade Stand, supra note 17, at 
1402-13. 
 105. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1271 (1982). 
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limiting advertising to children simply has not been very successful.106  Among 
other things, attempts generally have foundered on the shoals of arguments 
about what parents themselves can and should do on behalf of their children,107 
and then there’s always that troublesome First Amendment.108  Moreover, since 
the market provided by children’s manipulable preferences is so vast, 
corporations have strong incentives both to oppose regulations of this sort and 
to seek to subvert them. 
2. Progressives and Fellow Travelers 
Your garden variety corporate progressive is a person of liberal good will, 
who more-or-less normatively endorses the notion of corporate responsibility.109  
Some progressives have already suggested that corporations should attend to 
the needs of children as the nation’s future human capital.  The proposed 
methods of doing so involve parental work weeks, flex-time, and the like.110  
Corporate progressives have not yet focused specifically on exploitation of 
children’s manipulable preferences or its possible link to shareholder primacy, 
but the odds are good that they one day will endorse of the concern expressed in 
this article.  The mechanism for addressing that concern might well take the 
form of enhanced directorial discretion to look beyond shareholder interest and, 
by extension, to look beyond the bottom line.111  However, due in part to the 
general lack of diversity on America’s boards of directors, this might be a 
solution that is less than ideal.112 
Team production scholars focus on the relationship between the board and 
those with “team specific” inputs.113  Because consumers’ cash or credit are not 
specifically dedicated to a particular corporation, they would not typically be 
seen as part of the team whose interests are mediated by the board.114  An 
argument that the interests of children whose preferences are subject to 
exploitation have no real choice as to where their inputs are directed might, 
 
 106. See Lee J. Munger, Comment, Is Ronald McDonald the Next Joe Camel?  Regulating Fast Food 
Advertisements Targeting Children in Light of the American Overweight and Obesity Campaign, 3 CONN. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 456, 475-76 (2004), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1016&context=uconn/cpilj; Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 86-88; see also Beales, supra note 44 
(discussing subject generally). 
 107. See, e.g., Beales, supra note 44, at 880 (“The proposal, in reality, is designed to protect 
children from the weaknesses of their parents—and the parents from the wailing insistence of their 
children.” (quoting Editorial, The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22 (describing 
Federal Trade Commission rulemaking, later negated by Congress, limiting advertising to 
children))); Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 86-88. 
 108. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (finding the Communications Decency Act of 
1996 an unconstitutional infringement of adults’ First Amendment rights, notwithstanding 
compelling state interest in protecting children); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 
489 (1996) (holding that truthful, non-deceptive commercial advertising is protected by First 
Amendment).  For a general discussion of First Amendment considerations in this context, see 
Beales, supra note 44, at 883-88. 
 109. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. 
 110. See generally O’Connor-Felman, Human Capital, supra note 18 (detailing proposals). 
 111. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
 112. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 113. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text. 
 114. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
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however, make some headway.  Moreover, since team production scholars point 
to corporate philanthropy as one of the achievements of boards operating 
pursuant to the model, they presumably would believe avoidance of 
exploitation to be a type of philanthropy appropriately within the board’s 
discretion. 
Behavioral economics, of course, attempts to examine economic functioning 
in light of real-life human nature.115  Although the approach does not appear to 
have contemplated the problem of exploitation of children’s manipulable 
preferences, there seems to be no reason its adherents would be reluctant to do 
so, and it certainly does have the tools ready to hand.  Examining the 
motivations and biases of those many, parents included, who willingly lend 
themselves to the exploitive process—perhaps even while privately regretting 
the results—might be quite a fruitful endeavor. 
B. Feminism and Corporate Law 
There have been few applications of feminist analysis to corporate law,116 
although feminist descriptions of the effects of capitalism and neoclassical 
economics are voluminous.117  In recognizing the relevance of feminist analysis 
to corporate law, the critical first step is to remind ourselves of the various 
guises of inequality.  Although few overtly discriminatory laws can be identified 
in the field of corporate law, inequalities inhere in its gendered creation and 
application.118 
Some feminist explorations of corporate law have reflected an effort to 
identify and apply a set of values based on women’s shared experiences.119  
These values are often said to include compassion and caring, both of which 
may or may not be the product of centuries of oppression.120  Some feminists 
nonetheless accept these values as intuitively comfortable and, more 
importantly, potentially beneficial to society.121  The analytic process chosen to 
 
 115. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Kellye Y. Testy, Case Studies in Conservative and Progressive Legal Orders: Capitalism and 
Freedom. For Whom? Feminist Legal Theory and Progressive Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
87 (2004) (generally calling for an increase); Gabaldon, Lemonade Stand, supra note 17, at 1413-14 
(describing scarcity of applications of feminism in corporate law in early 1990s). 
 117. See, e.g., CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM (Zillah Eisenstein 
ed., 1979); MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED: NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS (1988). 
 118. Gabaldon, Lemonade Stand, supra note 17, at 1389. 
 119. Marion G. Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1186-87 (1991) (explaining relational feminism); Robin West, Jurisprudence and 
Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 13-42 (1988) [hereinafter West, Jurisprudence and Gender] (also addressing 
relational feminism). 
 120. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 15-
16 (1988);West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 119, at 20-28; see also NANCY CHODOROW, THE 
REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978); but see, e.g., 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies and Legal Education, or “The Rem-
Crits Go to Law School,” 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 72 nn.54-76 (1988); Joan W. Scott, Deconstructing 
Equality-versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33 
(1988). 
 121. See CHODOROW, supra note 120; CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); NEL 
NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMINIST APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984). 
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effectuate these values122 requires, of course, the grounding in women’s 
experience central to feminist method in general.123  This grounding demands 
examination of the actual context in which particular issues are presented.124  
Contextualization is deemed vital both because it arouses empathy and because 
it reveals situational differences that can and should be dealt with by case-
specific accommodations.125  Rules that are either manufactured or applied in the 
abstract, therefore, are regarded as likely to be somewhere between merely 
unreliable and outright oppressive.126 
1. A Feminist View of Shareholder Primacy and Limited Liability 
According to corporate law’s official story, it is designed to facilitate capital 
agglomeration by efficiently substituting management by the board of directors 
for the individual involvement of shareholders.127  In order to convince 
shareholders to relinquish control over the use of their capital they are offered 
both limited liability128 and a system in which the managers legally are charged 
with preferring shareholder interests. 
The feminist fly in the ointment, however, is that this model of corporate 
law is about permitting shareholders to benefit from risks imposed on others, 
and about artificially distancing individuals from the real-life effects of the 
enterprises in which they invest, thus decreasing their sense of personal 
responsibility.  It is a world in which shareholders need never be actively 
involved in the actions of the businesses operated for their ostensible benefit.  In 
the case of exploitation of children’s manipulable preferences, it is a world in 
which a group of grown-ups legally is prevented from assuming adult 
responsibility for prospective harms inflicted on children. 
Increasing involvement in corporate decision-making by institutional 
investors or increasing availability of socially conscious investment alternatives 
does not provide an answer to the problem.129  In fact, increasing interest by 
institutional investors has arguably contributed to enhancing the emphasis that 
 
 122. Many of these methods have been developed by or in conjunction with other feminist 
approaches.  See, e.g., Dorothy E. Smith, Women’s Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology, in 
FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY (Sandra Harding ed., 1987). 
 123. See Crain, supra note 119, at 1186-87. 
 124. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 120, at 10-11; Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted 
Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613 (1986); Ann 
C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986). 
 125. Gabaldon, Feminism, Fairness and Fiduciary Duty, supra note 40, at 1. 
 126. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 849 (1990) 
(discussing recognition of oppression). 
 127. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text. 
 128. For more general discussions of limited liability, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (1985) [hereinafter Easterbrook & 
Fischel, Limited Liability]; Gabaldon, Lemonade Stand, supra note 17; Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability 
and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80 (1991) [hereinafter Ribstein, Limited Liability]. 
 129. See David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The Material Edges 
of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 190 (2004) (quantifying portfolios 
screened for purposes of social responsibility investment as in excess of $2.15 trillion); Cynthia A. 
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
1197, 1287 (1999) (describing “dramatic” increase). 
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corporate management places on short-term shareholder value.130  Moreover, 
although the availability of socially conscious investment funds at first glance 
seems to be an unmitigated good, it also may constitute just enough in the way 
of a pressure valve to keep more wide-spread change from occurring.  In any 
event, the proof is in the pudding.  At the same time these trends have 
manifested themselves, exploitation of children’s manipulable preferences has 
increased.  This temporal coincidence does not demonstrate cause and effect, but 
it surely establishes that institutional investors are not meaningfully addressing 
the welfare of children as consumers. 
2. A Feminist View of “Internal Affairs” 
Corporate law is, more or less by definition, a way of regulating the 
“internal affairs” of the corporate entity131 by adjusting the interests of 
historically identified corporate constituencies.132  This paradigm is limited with 
respect to its ability to determine inside interests other than the common 
denominator of profit maximization.  Moreover, since corporate law focuses on 
“internal affairs,” any attempt to integrate the interests of outsiders seems 
uncomfortably retrofit.133  Feminists seeking either a broader definition of 
cognizable shareholder concerns or attention to non-shareholder interests will 
find the entire concept of internal affairs unduly constraining. 
While the emphasis that corporate law places on “internal affairs” may 
suggest that the a feminist solution to the problem of exploitation of children’s 
manipulable preferences must be a matter of external law—that is, a matter of 
regulation imposed on advertising and other activities—there also exists another 
possibility.  The corporate law paradigm may be tweaked either by invoking the 
meaningful expression of shareholder interest on specific matters involving 
children’s manipulable preferences or by redefining the concept of permissible 
corporate profitability.  Both of these methods are further addressed in Part IV. 
C. A Practical Analysis 
Toward the end of the twentieth century, issuers and thoughtful observers 
realized that, perverse as it might seem, stock price sometimes could be 
maximized by engaging in businesses without a proven track record and 
without a link to past earnings—in other words, without a predictable income 
stream.134  This strategy avoided placing a limit on the upside potential of stock 
 
 130. Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes But Uncertain 
Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349 (2000); cf. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting Real about Corporate Social 
Responsibility: A Reply to Professor Greenfield, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (2002) (analyzing trends). 
 131. See, e.g., Note, The Internal Affairs Doctrine: Theoretical Justifications and Tentative Explanations 
for Its Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480, 1480 (2002). 
 132. For a general discussion, see William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 385 (1990) (discussing historic identification and matters related to corporate 
constituencies). 
 133. See, e.g., id.; MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY, supra note 70, at 104-105. 
 134. For a general discussion of irrational stock pricing during the late twentieth century, see 
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2002).  For a discussion of the possibility of regulating 
such pricing, see Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and the 
Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L. 225 (2001). 
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price, thus permitting a form of stock speculation that would have been 
completely unjustifiable had projected earnings been expected to have linear 
continuity with those of the past.  These businesses tended to be novel, to 
involve rapid product innovation or to be reliant on irrational consumer 
preferences.  Computer hardware, software, game-ware, and other 
entertainment devices fit the bill perfectly, as did availability of internet services.  
In order to stay unpredictable, rapid development of services and products—
and thus rapid obsolescence of older products—became a necessity.  As a result, 
a great deal of change occurred in the identified areas of opportunity—areas, not 
incidentally, in which a great deal of consumption was driven by children’s 
manipulable preferences. 
The migration of women into the workplace and the collapse of that brief 
but idealized interlude of separate spheres and protected childhood135 coincided 
with, and very arguably accelerated, the dramatic technological advances 
described above.  These technological advances permitted the rapid 
development of new products, as well as the proliferation of ways to market 
them, but did not give rise to any realistic way for parents to control their 
consumption by children.136  As a result, women have, through workplace 
participation, contributed to the problem of exploitation of children’s 
manipulable preferences.  At home, however, the power of women, like that of 
men, to address the issue is severely limited. 
One hazards a guess—in fact, one knows from common sense as well as 
from studies (with numbers and everything)—that many of the objects of 
children’s manipulable preferences are not what parents, left to their own 
devices, would choose for their children.137  At the same time, they are not 
objects that parents realistically can deny.  First, parents who are often less 
interested in video games and less technically adept than their offspring, may 
not fully comprehend the attributes of the merchandise in question are.  Second, 
they do not feel they have time or energy to seek alternatives.  Third, they may 
feel trapped by the problem of the commons,138 reasoning that, if they invest in 
rigorous monitoring of their own children’s consumption, but others do not, the 
“spill-over” effects on the monitored children are unavoidable.139  The only thing 
that may be achieved in the process is intense parent-child hostility,140 feelings of 
parental failure,141 and perhaps some genuine social adjustment issues for the 
 
 135. See generally supra notes 17-86. 
 136. See Campbell, Ads2Kids, supra note 52, at 340 (describing the futility of screening devices). 
 137. See Hymel, supra note 22, at 388. 
 138. The “tragedy of the commons” problem arises when the benefits of an activity do not accrue 
solely to the actor.  See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, Pitfalls in the Analysis of Public Goods, 10 J.L. & ECON. 
199 (1967). 
 139. See Woodhouse, supra note 18, at 106 (noting that “to control the relentless flow of media 
influences, a parent would have to remove the child from peer influences and from mainstream 
social institutions”). 
 140. See Hymel, supra note 22, at 411 (describing “undermining” of authority); Munger, supra 
note 106, at 478-479 (describing parent-child transactions and referring to “assaults on parental 
authority”). 
 141. See Hymel, supra note 22, at 389 (describing psychic effects on low income families). 
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child who feels “different” from his friends.142  Finally, parents may be driven by 
their guilt over self-perceived neglect of their children to make purchases to 
substitute for attention.143 
D. Exploitation of Children’s Manipulable Preferences: A Gendered Issue 
Feminist analysis decodes gendered corporate law’s shareholder-preferring 
but disempowering norms.  It recognizes that permitting the investment of 
resources with limited liability for their use is a form of moral hazard—an 
abdication of responsibility.  It also willingly exposes corporate law’s formal, but 
flawed, underlying assumptions about rationality in the marketplace.  When 
experience is invoked, it becomes perfectly clear that assuming parental 
supervision of children’s purchases is very much like, the old joke about a can 
opener.144  Feminist invocation of experience tells us of harried women working 
“second shifts” at home.  It also describes observations of children gaining 
weight, and of children clamoring for, and being obsessed with, technology, sex, 
and violence.  It does not prove a “but-for” connection, but it tells us how we 
feel.  Irrational or not, we feel guilty.  It is not unrealistic to suspect that those 
who feel guiltiest may be more easily mobilized than those whose pangs are less 
intense. 
Thus, there are several reasons why exploitation of children’s manipulable 
preferences may fairly be regarded as a gendered issue.  First, it may be the 
consequence of a male—constructed corporate law.  Second, exploitation of 
children’s manipulable preferences may be a particular problem for women 
because we have developed the analytic tools to identify it.  Third, and most 
obviously, it is a particular problem for women because society has convinced 
us to feel that it is. 
 
And Now, More from Joe: 
Gentlemen and Lady, theres just a little more to cover.  There are 
people out there who want to mess up this sweet little deal.  Theyre 
suggesting ways to interfere with our ability to give kids the things we want 
them to want.  Here are some things to watch out for.  (But dont worry too 
much just yet.) 
 
 142. Id. at 410. 
 143. See generally Allison Pugh, From Compensation to Childhood Wonder: Why Parents Buy (Ctr. for 
Working Families, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 39, 2002), available at  
http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/berkeley/papers/39.pdf (discussing parental motivations); Allison Pugh, 
When is a Doll More than a Doll?  Selling Toys as Reassurance for Maternal and Class Anxiety (Ctr. for 
Working Families, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Working Paper No. 28, 2001), available at 
http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/berkeley/papers/28.pdf (also discussing parental motivations). 
 144. A short-form version of the joke goes something like this.  Three men are stranded on a 
desert island: a lawyer, an accountant, and an economist.  The only food they have among them is a 
can of tuna fish.  The lawyer and accountant exhaust themselves looking for rocks or coconuts with 
which to pound the can open.  The economist watches, laughing.  In frustration, the lawyer shouts, 
“Okay, if you’re so smart, you open it.”  The economist smugly says, “It’s simple.  First, you assume 
a can opener.” 
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IV.  SOLUTIONS 
This article is not meant to suggest that women can or should return to the 
exclusive bosoms of their families.  The realizations set forth do mean, however, 
that anyone willing to be informed by feminist method and experience can and 
should take heed of the phenomenon of children’s manipulable preferences, and 
act to solve the problem as best they can.  As stated above, confronting the 
problem at home, where childcare largely has been relegated as traditional 
women’s work, is not the best that can be done.  Individual fingers in a 
collective dike comprise a plausible strategy only if the dike has not already 
been breached.  The situation is too far gone, and the beast must be confronted 
where it lives. 
A. The Best Shot 
The beast lives in corporate profit.  It could be fully contained only through 
containing its profitability.  If corporations simply were precluded from 
profiting from the exploitation of children’s manipulable preferences, the world 
of childhood soon would become a far different place—one with far less 
electronic violence, far fewer celebrity-endorsed items of apparel, and no Happy 
Meals.  This proposal, however, presents several difficulties. 
The first and largest difficulty, which simply must be ignored for purposes 
of continued discussion, is political feasibility.145  Those who have gained the 
most from exploitation of children’s manipulable preferences would mobilize 
quickly and throw so much money into lobbying and the like that the proposal 
surely would die aborning.  Exposure of the proposal to public view nonetheless 
might have some useful effect on public opinion and might further discussion. 
To have any significant effect, though, the proposal must be a coherent one, 
and herein lies the second group of difficulties—those of articulation.  How does 
one rigorously define “children’s manipulable preferences,” “exploitation,” or 
“profit”?  Furthermore, how can profitability be limited?  What penalty can 
there be for breaching the proposed rule?  Upon whom would such penalty be 
imposed?  Matters of definition will be discussed below before the issue of 
general formulation is addressed. 
Thus far, this article has used the term “children’s manipulable 
preferences” simply to describe those preferences of children that are subject to 
manipulation.146  For purposes of action, the concept must be further refined.  
First, “children” must be defined.  Reference to age is both convenient and 
usual, though inevitably both over- and under-inclusive.  Let us say, however, 
that a “child” is anyone under the age of eighteen.  Articulating which 
“preferences” are subject to manipulation is more of a challenge, unless one is 
willing to make the concept a self-proving one: That is, if someone is trying to 
manipulate a preference, let us assume that it is one that may be manipulated.  If 
no one is trying to engage in manipulation, there is, after all, no problem to be 
addressed. 
 
 145. For a description of past lobbying efforts by, for example, the fast food industry, see 
McCann, supra note 46, at 1195-96. 
 146. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Content of a Proposed Rule 
An appropriate rule, then, might focus on preventing specific activities, 
known either as “manipulation” or “exploitation” with respect to those under 
the age of eighteen.  Describing the verboten activities presents a genuine 
challenge.  How might we capture the full range of product adulterations (such 
as nicotine and violence contents), celebrity endorsements, hypnotic and 
suggestive advertisements, and the like (and unlike)?  Although it indeed would 
be difficult to provide an all-inclusive definition with enough clarity to be 
enforceable in any sense, it would not be particularly difficult or unreasonable to 
say that advertising directed to an audience composed largely of children is an 
attempt to manipulate that audience.147 
Consider, for a moment, then, the consequences of a rule that prohibits all 
advertising to children, but not the advertising to adults of children’s products.  
The first and most obvious consequence is that children would be less likely to 
be attracted to, and, indeed, less aware of certain products.  The market for those 
products presumably would decline, as would the availability and development 
of products for that market.  This is not, in truth, all that distressing.  No one, 
after all, is marketing life-saving drugs on Nickelodeon.  Of course, if 
advertising to children went away, so would Nickelodeon and, presumably, so 
would a lot of other children’s programming.  If elimination of advertising to 
children led to overall decline in television viewing however, it more than 
arguably would be a good thing.148 
What would not be such a good thing, however, is the possible loss of jobs 
that could accompany the demise of Nickelodeon and other frivolous and even 
arguably harmful children’s products.  This is regrettable (easy to say, since it is 
not law professorships we are talking about), and perhaps a dislocation better 
suffered in stages.  This suggests a sunset approach to advertising to children, 
rather than anything like immediate prohibition. 
Another possible approach would be to sunset the profitability of 
transactions involving certain products sold largely to or for children.  Consider, 
next, a rule specifying that, over time, permitted profit levels on particular items 
would ratchet downward.  The items would include clothing, fast food, and 
electronic entertainment devices marketed to children.  Would such a rule mean 
that children would be naked, hungry, and bored?  Presumably, this would 
depend on the profit level permitted. 
2. The Format of a Proposed Rule 
In any event, the dangers inherent in a rule directed either to prohibition of 
advertising or profitability may have some informational value for the choice of 
format.  There are at least three ways in which any such rule generally might be 
cast.  First, the specified activity (be it advertising or profit-taking) might be 
 
 147. See BRIAN WILCOX ET AL., REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN, 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1-2 (2004), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/cyf/advertisingandchildren.pdf 
(discussing the proposal of the American Psychological Association to ban advertising directed at 
children under nine). 
 148. If, on the other hand, it led to viewing of adult programs, it would not be a good thing. 
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criminalized.  Second, the activity generally might be made ultra vires149 and thus 
placed beyond the power of corporations.  Third, specified acts might be made 
to require the approval of the shareholders of the corporation. 
a. From Without: Criminalization 
Criminalization of specified conduct is a proposal for reform from 
“outside” corporate law.  It utilizes a format that is easily understood because of 
its familiarity to the populace at large.  Whenever corporate conduct is 
criminalized, however, the issue of who is to be penalized presents itself.  
Should the targets of prosecution be corporate entities or real people?  In either 
case, what showings should be made necessary with respect to state of mind?  
Problems with vagueness and First Amendment issues also could take on 
excruciating proportions.150  It seems, moreover, to be a very large hammer that 
most legislators would be reluctant to swing, particularly in light of anticipated 
opposition by interested parties.  Based on past history in the context of 
attempts to eliminate advertising to children,151 criminalization is the least 
promising of the three approaches posited. 
b. From Within 
i. Ultra Vires 
Another approach, this one from within corporate law’s standard 
taxonomy, would be to make advertising or profiting from children’s 
manipulable preference an ultra vires act, or one that is beyond the corporation’s 
legal powers.  This is an interesting thought experiment.  Saying that an act is 
beyond a corporation’s legal powers does not make the act impossible, however, 
since the people animating the corporate structure are still quite capable of 
engaging in it.  This means that there would have to be mechanisms for 
deterring those individuals—injunctions, monetary penalties or the like.  Even if 
these mechanisms operated imperfectly, the approach might have significant 
symbolic value and do quite a bit to shape corporate behavior.  It is, again, 
however, a very large hammer that would be difficult to employ. 
ii. Shareholder Approval 
By contrast, requiring shareholder approval of certain acts seems almost 
politically palatable, constitutionally superior (at least to the route of 
criminalization), and eminently achievable.  There are a variety of ways a 
shareholder approval requirement might be cast.  For instance, publicly-held 
corporations could be required to prepare reports on products marketed to and 
for children, detailing both advertising expenditures and providing general 
 
 149. For an overview of the ultra vires doctrine and its continuing utility, see Kent Greenfield, 
Ultra Vires Lives!  A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (with Notes on How Corporate Law Could 
Reform International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2001); see also Katie J. Thoennes, Comment, 
Frankenstein Incorporated: The Rise of Corporate Power and Personhood in the United States, 28 HAMLINE 
L. REV. 203 (2005) (providing historical overview). 
 150. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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product descriptions.  These reports could be posted on the corporate web site.152  
Any shareholder wishing to call for a vote at the next annual meeting on any 
practice or expenditure thus exposed and representing more than a defined de 
minimis amount then could be entitled to do so.  The vote of the shareholders 
even could be made binding (rather than merely advisory). 
From the standpoint of those concerned with exploitation issues, the 
greatest benefit of such a requirement would be sensitizing shareholders (and 
consequently board members) to the fact that the issue exists.  Its most 
significant effect might be to shed sunlight on child-driven markets.  It also is 
possible that if shareholders were specifically given the right to vote on, say, the 
use of icons such as Joe Camel, they just might say “no.”  Even institutional 
investors generally pressing for improved profitability might incline toward 
social responsibility if the sunlight is sufficiently intense. 
B. Existing Tools 
Although reform along the lines alluded to above may be a worthy goal, 
many feminists willingly recognize that real life is not perfect, and that the 
desire for more sweeping changes should not stand in the way of incremental 
reform.  The tools that are practicably accessible should not be ignored.  These 
include the conscientious attempt to consider the exploitation issue oneself and 
the conscientious attempt to bring it to the attention of others.  In considering 
the utility of those implements, it is useful to contemplate their availability to 
rank-and-file workers, members of management, and shareholders. 
1. Workers 
Contractarian literature essentially assumes that workers and the 
corporations that employ them have equal bargaining power.153  Progressive 
literature emphatically diverges from this assumption;154 experience surely 
suggests that the progressives are closer to the mark.  Relative disempowerment, 
however, is not complete disempowerment.  Simple day-to-day mindfulness of, 
and comment on, the issue of the exploitation of children’s manipulable 
preferences may have some useful effect. 
This is true notwithstanding the inevitability that some voices will be heard 
more clearly than others.  In this regard, it is interesting to note speculations that 
women, who are accustomed to their role as workplace outsiders, generally are 
more willing than men to act as whistle blowers and call attention within and 
 
 152. See Monsma & Buckley, supra note 129, at 200 (describing posting of reports on 
environmental and social practices by Fortune 500 and other companies). 
 153. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability, supra note 128, at 104 (characterizing 
employees as “voluntary creditors” and stating that “[t]he compensation they demand will be a 
function of the risks they face”).  Even where the bargaining is labeled “quasi-voluntary” and is 
conceded to be hypothetical, such bargaining is regarded as normatively desirable.  See Ribstein, 
Limited Liability, supra note 128, at 129-130; but see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward 
Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1079, 1120-21 (1991) (characterizing as 
“involuntary” those creditors entering contracts without substantial awareness of relevant risks). 
 154. See generally O’Connor, Displaced Workers, supra note 68 (describing progressive worker 
disempowerment). 
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without corporations to situations meriting redress.155  One can imagine that 
women who are sensitized to the exploitation issue and who also feel 
responsible for contributing to the problem through their personal and 
professional behavior it might seek to cast beams of light on the subject. 
2. Management 
Managers, including for purposes of this discussion members of the board 
of directors, generally are motivated by the mainstream mantra of maximizing 
shareholder value.156  As such, they presumably bear primary blame for the 
exploitation of children’s manipulable preferences.  It would be well for 
managers to become sensitized to the issue, as well as to become more aware of 
the discretion that management actually possesses to engage in actions that do 
not maximize shareholder value.  In this respect, the business judgment rule 
confers common law leeway;157 corporate constituency statutes specifically 
permitting the consideration of non-shareholder interests go even further.158 
Obviously, the real-life competitive pressures experienced by corporate 
management thus far seem to have outweighed the theoretical utility of these 
tools.  It is possible that additional sensitization to the issue of exploitation 
might have a useful effect, and it once again is interesting to speculate whether 
women, whose roles in management are increasing, might do anything 
differently than men.  There is evidence suggesting that “token” women159 in 
management are unlikely to effect meaningful reform, because they are likely to 
assume, indeed are likely already to have assumed, the attitudes of the 
majority.160  It is, in any event, indisputable that the high-achieving women who 
make their way into management are much less likely to have children than 
either their male peers or female rank-and-file.161  As a result, the context of their 
lives might render them relatively more interested in issues other than those 
presented by children’s manipulable preferences. 
 
 155. See, e.g., Judy B. Rosener, Why Are Women More Likely to Reveal Corporate Scandals?, PR 
NEWSWIRE (U.S.), May 16, 2005; but see Paige Wiser, Can Women Keep Secrets?  What if Woodward and 
Bernstein Weren’t Men?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 6, 2005, at 58 (referring to studies indicating that 
women are not more likely to reveal secrets than men). 
 156. For a helpful discussion of the extralegal forces prompting corporate boards to observe a 
shareholder primacy norm, see Gevurtz, supra note 130, at 651-53. 
 157. This is conceded even by contractarians.  See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE, supra note 56, at 93.  See generally, Charles Hansen, Comment, The ALI Corporate 
Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and the Business Judgment Rule, 41 Bus. Law. 1237 (1986) 
(describing various attempts to articulate the business judgment rule). 
 158. See MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY, supra note 70, at 104-05. 
 159. “Token” women are those chosen to achieve superficial, rather than meaningful, diversity 
goals.  See generally supra note 2. 
 160. For a discussion of the co-option process, see John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize 
Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13 
(David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). 
 161. See O’Connor-Felman, Human Capital, supra note 18, at 1349; SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT, 
PROFESSIONAL WOMEN AND THE QUEST FOR CHILDREN (2002) (indicating that forty-nine percent of 
women who earn $100,000 or more were still childless after age forty, and many regretted it). 
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3. Shareholders 
Shareholders do have choices about alternative investment vehicles; it is 
arguable that they might be sensitized to “vote with their feet” against corporate 
decisions that smell of exploitation.  Individual shareholders, however, do not 
have limitless time to investigate and act on their findings about corporate 
behavior, especially since they may feel that their decision to withdraw their 
investments will at best, have only a marginal impact on corporate decision 
making.  Despite this, we can invoke the homely aphorism that “every little bit 
helps.”  We also can note the slow but steady growth of social responsibility 
funds,162 which one day might add the exploitation of children’s manipulable 
preferences to the list of activities for which such funds screen. 
There are, in addition, two other tools available to the relatively energetic 
shareholder.  The first of these is derivative litigation.  This is litigation brought 
by a shareholder on the corporation’s behalf, typically against members of 
corporate management for actions taken in violation of their various fiduciary 
duties.163  Skipping lightly over the demand and other procedural impediments 
to bringing suits of this type brings us to the crux of difficulty.  To avoid 
frivolity, there must be a credible argument that actions exploiting children’s 
manipulable preferences violate some duty to the corporation.  It seems unlikely 
that a court would hold that they do, given that the  “quixotic” lawsuits brought 
against corporations by obese consumers and grieving survivors of those killed 
in rampages have thus far not succeeded.  The latitude afforded management by 
the business judgment rule is simply so broad that most management decisions 
are unassailable. 
A more promising tool is the possible use of shareholder proposals.  
Although the shareholders of public corporations do not, in fact, have the power 
to preclude corporate engagement in specific activities, exploitive or 
otherwise,164 they do have the power to adopt “advisory” resolutions informing 
management of their wishes.165  These resolutions arguably have a shaping effect 
on corporate conduct.166  Moreover, in recent years, changes in position by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission have enhanced the practical ability of 
shareholders to have motions relating to issues of social concern considered, 
 
 162. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 163. See generally Tom Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit and 
the Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REV. 355, 387 (1999) (discussing derivative litigation); Theresa 
A. Gabaldon, Free Riders and the Greedy Gadfly: Examining Aspects of Shareholder Litigation as an Exercise 
in Integrating Ethical Regulation and Laws of General Applicability, 73 MINN. L. REV. 425, 433 (1988) (also 
discussing derivative litigation). 
 164. See supra Part IV-A for a proposal which would grant shareholders the power to preclude 
corporate engagement in specific activities. 
 165. For description of the shareholder proposal mechanism and its possible uses to improve 
working conditions and thus the lives of workers’ children, see O’Connor-Felman, Human Capital, 
supra note 18, at 1329-30, 1339-41; see also Kevin Healy & Jeffrey M. Tapick, Climate Change: It’s Not 
Just a Policy Issue for Corporate Counsel - It’s a Legal Problem, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 89, 105-06 (2004) 
(describing increasing use of shareholder proposals to address environmental issues); Monsma & 
Buckley, supra note 129, at 190-91 (also describing increasing use of shareholder proposals to address 
environmental issues). 
 166. See supra note 162; John M. Holcomb, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related Legal Issues, and Global 
Comparisons, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 175, 177 (2004). 
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notwithstanding their involvement in the ordinary business of the corporation.167  
With some attention to presentation, motions relating to the exploitation of 
children presumably would fit the bill. 
 
Joes conclusion: 
In summary, gentlemen and lady, any corporate board that isnt giving 
children exactly what they want is missing the boat, and risking the high 
dudgeon of its shareholders, none of whom seem to be noticing that the 
company is producing things they might not want their own children to have.  
(But you know what they say about consistency and hobgoblins!)  In any 
event, I know by this time Im singing to the choir.  Any questions? 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Children have not been body-snatched from their parents, but they have 
been mind-snatched.  Saying that the women’s liberation movement and 
corporate America are complicit is a nice turn of phrase, but far too 
inflammatory and value-laden.  Suffice it, instead, to say that the perfect storm 
of parental time crunch, technological advances, increased workforce 
participation, and corporate profit-seeking behavior have combined to put 
artificially aroused and exaggerated desires of children behind the wheel of an 
out-of-control marketplace which feeds back into those aroused and 
exaggerated desires.  Simply ignoring the problem will not make it go away. 
This article takes the position that the issue of the exploitation of children’s 
manipulable preferences must be raised and examined.  As part of this process, 
it is important to call on the experience of actual human beings and to recount 
real stories.168  Empathy must be generated and attention must be paid.  It is 
speculation to indicate that the empathy and attention of women might more 
easily be attracted than that of men.  Nonetheless, feminist method demands, 
with respect to this issue as with respect to all issues, focus on the actual 
experience of women in the workplace and at home. 
Idealized portrayals of the life of children in earlier decades frequently 
place those children in the context of warm and loving families, constantly 
available to provide support in making the “right” decisions, in bringing up 
children in the straight and true. Perhaps Darby and his friends did indeed 
enjoy parental counterweight to the nascent advertising attempts to influence 
their consumption.  Perhaps not. 
In any event, the mothers of America have gone to work.  If not Darby’s, 
then Michael Levy’s or the New Boy’s.  If not your children’s, then my son’s.  
Whether or not the precedent imagery was correct, it is indisputable that the 
mothers who peopled that imagery have less time to spend in the home.  It is 
just as indisputable that they feel guilty about the amount of attention they are 
 
 167. See Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”: Shareholder Voice and 
Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735 (2003) (discussing progress and impediments to 
progress). 
 168. See Robert L. Palmer, When Law Fails: Ethics, Commerce, and Tales of Value, 2 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 245 (1993) (discussing social value of storytelling). 
09_GABALDON.DOC 4/28/2006  8:57 AM 
 JOE CAMEL 235 
able to give to their children.  This may be part of the permanent human 
condition, although one hopes that it is not.  It is, nonetheless, a reason to be 
concerned with, and to pay attention to, the exploitation of children’s 
manipulable preferences. 
 
Joes last word: 
Next month, our topic will be Children in Third-World Countries: Not 
Yet Giving Their All. 
